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I.   INTRODUCTION
During the 1997 legislative session, the Florida Legislature
amended significant aspects of Florida’s law regulating property in-
surance.1 This Article focuses on the latest modifications designed to
make property insurance available through commercial and quasi-
governmental mechanisms. It examines the policy rationale for
modifying the existing laws, and the practical effect the changes will
have on the insurance market.
Parts II and III of this Article provide a general, schematic, and
historical discussion of the quasi-governmental property insurance
mechanisms available in Florida. Part IV details the 1997 legislative
modifications to these mechanisms, while Part V provides recom-
mendations to the 1998 Legislature. Part VI concludes that although
the 1997 changes expand access to property insurance coverage in
Florida, the price of this access is ultimately borne by all policyhold-
ers through increased rates.
II.   BACKGROUND ON PROPERTY INSURANCE IN FLORIDA
Property insurers in Florida are still recovering from the effects of
Hurricane Andrew, which struck in August 1992.2 The $16 billion in
                                                                                                                   
* Associate, Taylor, Day, Currie & Burnett, Tallahassee, Fla.; B.S., Duke Univer-
sity, 1982; J.D., Stetson University, 1996; M.P.H., University of South Florida, 1986.
1. See Act effective May 9, 1997, ch. 97-55, 1997 Fla. Laws 322 (amending FLA. STAT.
§ 627.351 (Supp. 1996)).
2. See FLORIDA LEGIS. WORKING GROUP ON RESIDUAL PROP. INS. MARKETS, FINAL
REPORT 1 (1996) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT].
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property losses sustained in South Florida far exceeded insurance
companies’ expectations, particularly because only $1.5 billion was
collected in annual premiums.3 Because of the extraordinary losses,
several insurance companies became insolvent and most others be-
lieved they were overexposed in Florida.4 A property insurance
availability crisis arose as insurers recognized that their premium
rates were inadequate when compared to the potential losses and ex-
traordinary exposure in Florida.5
In order to combat an exodus of insurance companies from the
state and to stabilize the insurance market,6 the Florida Legislature
convened three separate special sessions during 1992 and 1993. The
Florida Department of Insurance and the Legislature subsequently
imposed four successive moratoriums on property insurers, requiring
them to continue existing coverage for property located in Florida’s
high risk areas.7
A.   The Residential Joint Underwriting Association
During the December 1992 special legislative session, the Legisla-
ture created the Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint
Underwriting Association (Residential JUA).8 Persons denied prop-
erty and casualty insurance coverage through private insurers can
seek to purchase property coverage through the Residential JUA.9
All property insurers in the state are required to participate in the
program through regular and emergency assessments.10 The Resi-
dential JUA Board, which is appointed by the Insurance Commis-
sioner and comprised of representatives from the insurance industry,
consumer advocates, and Department of Insurance employees, is
authorized to write policies, collect premiums and assessments, and
pay claims to those insured under the program.11 By statute, the
rates charged by the Residential JUA may not be lower than the av-
erage rates of the highest commercial carrier among the twenty car-
riers with the highest volume.12
                                                                                                                   
3. See FLORIDA H.R. COMM. ON INS., FLORIDA’S PROPERTY INSURANCE CRISIS 1 (1994)
(on file with comm.) [hereinafter INSURANCE CRISIS]. The $16 billion in insured damages
makes Hurricane Andrew the costliest natural disaster in world history. See id.
4. See id. at 6-7.
5. See id. at 1-2.
6. See id. at 14.
7. See id. at 3.
8. See Act effective Apr. 10, 1993, ch. 92-345, § 3, 1993 Fla. Laws 1, 7 (codified at
FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6) (1993)).
9. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6) (1997).
10. See id. § 627.351(6)(b)(3).
11. See id. § 627.351(6)(b).
12. See id. § 627.351(6)(d)(2). The time limit for this policy has been extended. Addi-
tionally, for mobile home policies, the rate must match the top five rather than the top
eight insurers as was provided in past years. See id.
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The Residential JUA was only intended to be a short term, safety
net mechanism to provide insurance opportunities.13 As originally
envisioned, the Residential JUA was seen as an insurer of last re-
sort, to provide residential insurance for applicants who were unable
to gain insurance through the voluntary cooperative market.14 Thus,
the Residential JUA should have only been necessary for a limited
period of time while the private market rebounded from the events of
Hurricane Andrew. However, the Residential JUA has exceeded all
expectations and “has become, by virtue of its size, a significant im-
pediment to the restoration of a stable and competitive residential
property insurance market in [Florida].”15 Based on the number of
policies and the value of property insured, the Residential JUA has
become the second largest property insurance carrier in the state.16
In response, measures have been undertaken to accelerate the trans-
fer of policies from the Residential JUA to the private market.17
B.   The Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association
The Residential JUA was modeled after other “insurance risk ap-
portionment plans,”18 principally the Florida Windstorm Underwrit-
ing Association (FWUA). The FWUA was established in 1970 to
provide windstorm coverage19 for persons unable to purchase cover-
age through the private market.20 As originally designed, the FWUA
allowed property owners who were in good faith entitled to wind-
storm insurance to contract for the equitable apportionment of in-
surance if unable to procure it through ordinary methods.21 Thus,
property owners denied access to windstorm coverage through the
                                                                                                                   
13. See id. § 627.3511(1) (stating that the Residential JUA has far exceeded initial
expectations).
14. See INSURANCE CRISIS, supra note 3, at 2.
15. FLA. STAT. § 627.3511(1) (1997). As of November 1996, the Residential JUA pro-
vided coverage for approximately 930,000 policy holders. Interview with Wesley Williams,
Marketing and Research Analyst, Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint Un-
derwriting Association, in Tallahassee, Fla. (Sept. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Williams Inter-
view].
16.  See Williams Interview, supra note 15. As of July 1997, the Residential JUA had
151,356 policies in force in Dade County, 104,061 policies in Broward County, and 71,699
policies in Palm Beach County. See id.
17. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 627.3511 (1997) (encouraging insurers to remove policies
from the Residential JUA through the payment of an incentive bonus of $100 per policy).
As a result, on August 31, 1997, there were 603,463 policies written by the Residential
JUA. See Williams Interview, supra note 15.
18. FLA. STAT. § 627.351 (1997) (providing for residual market mechanisms which
allow insurers in the state to allocate “uninsurable” risks among themselves).
19. “Windstorm insurance” includes coverage against damage caused directly by
windstorms and hail. See FWUA, AMENDED AND RESTATED PLAN OF OPERATION AND
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT 2 (1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter FWUA PLAN].
20. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(5)(a) (Supp. 1970) (current version at FLA. STAT. §
627.351(2) (1997)).
21. See id. § 627.351(2)(a) (1997).
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private market can purchase insurance through the FWUA.22 In ad-
dition to the inability to obtain coverage in the voluntary market, to
qualify for FWUA coverage an area must demonstrate that the lack
of available windstorm coverage adversely affects the economic
growth and development of the community, and that “mortgages are
in default, and financial institutions are unable to make loans.”23
The area must also show that it is enforcing the structural require-
ments of the Florida Minimum Building Codes.24 Lastly, the area
must demonstrate that extending windstorm insurance coverage is
consistent with coastal management regulation.25
The FWUA, governed by a board consisting of insurance company
representatives, provides windstorm insurance as a direct writer and
has the authority to issue policies, collect premiums, and pay claims,
as well as collect regular and emergency assessments from all prop-
erty insurers operating in the state.26 The premium rates are set by
the board, subject to approval by the Department of Insurance, so
long as rates are calculated with the objective of generating suffi-
cient funds to pay all anticipated claims.27 In addition to the premi-
ums paid by policyholders, program costs are supplemented by the
imposition of assessments on property insurers in Florida.28 These
assessments are determined on a pro rata basis according to the
amount of business the individual insurance companies write in the
state.29
When the claims exceeded the regularly assessed amounts plus
the premiums paid under the program, the shortfall was historically
borne by the property insurers doing business in Florida through
deficit assessments.30 Since 1995, however, insurers can pass any
deficit assessments on to the rates of all policyholders.31 Thus, the
FWUA represents a compromise of public policy to assure access to
windstorm insurance in high risk areas and a mandated subsidy
from other insureds (i.e., policyholders) throughout the state.32 The
FWUA, unlike the Residential JUA, was intended to operate over an
extended period in limited areas that lacked a voluntary windstorm
                                                                                                                   
22. See id.
23. Id. § 627.351(2)(c)(2)(a).
24. See id. § 627.351(2)(c)(2)(b).
25. See id. § 627.351(2)(c)(2)(c).
26. See id. § 627.351(2)(b).
27. See FWUA PLAN, supra note 19, at 7.
28. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2)(b) (1997).
29. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(2)(a) (stating that regular assessments, with some excep-
tions, are based on the proportion of net direct premiums written in the previous year).
30. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(2) (1993).
31. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(2)(d) (1997).
32. As of January 1997, the FWUA carried 283,000 policies with a total insured value
of structure and contents of $49 billion. See Fla. S. Comm. on Banking & Ins., CS for SB
794 (1997) Staff Analysis 3 (Mar. 5, 1997) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter Staff Analysis].
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insurance coverage market.33 The FWUA initially operated in the
Florida Keys, but over time it expanded to other high risk areas
along the coast that demonstrated a need for windstorm insurance.34
Despite the narrow intent of the FWUA, it has grown considera-
bly. Insurers have taken advantage of the opportunity to nonrenew
some property insurance policies including windstorm coverage, and
have rewritten some policies without windstorm protection, which is
then provided by the FWUA. Using the FWUA has allowed insur-
ance companies to shed some of their exposure and equitably appor-
tion their risk, particularly in overexposed areas such as Dade,
Broward, and Palm Beach counties.35
Because the Residential JUA and the FWUA have surpassed
their intended purposes, Florida’s 1997 property insurance legisla-
tion focused on incremental, operational modifications to these in-
surance mechanisms.36
III.   A NEED FOR MODIFICATIONS TO THE RESIDENTIAL JUA AND
FWUA
The public policy behind these insurance mechanisms—to make
property insurance available to all persons in the state—conflicts
with the traditional notions of “risk-pooling.” As typically under-
stood, risk pooling reflects an allocation of apparently similar or ho-
mogeneous risk into different pools that are then rated according to
each pool’s relative risk characteristics and loss expectations.37 The
Legislature established insurance pools to make coverage available
when the private market would not or could not do so.38 However,
some observers believe that the government’s efforts to make insur-
ance available has inhibited the private market’s ability to provide
coverage.39
Although homeowners’ premiums have risen by a statewide aver-
age of eighty-eight percent over the past four years to cover the
greater expectations for potential loss, many property owners cannot
purchase insurance through the private market.40 Two competing
views emerge as to the effect that increased premium rates have on
the availability of insurance. Some insurance companies and trade
associations argue that if rates for property insurance were sufficient
                                                                                                                   
33. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2)(c)-(d) (1997).
34. See FLA. S. COMM. ON BANKING & INS., ESTABLISHING GEOGRAPHICAL
BOUNDARIES FOR THE FLORIDA WINDSTORM UNDERWRITING ASSOCIATION 2 (1997) (on file
with comm.) [hereinafter GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES].
35. See id. at 15-17.
36. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351 (1997).
37. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 2 (2d ed. 1995).
38. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2),(6) (1997).
39. See id. § 627.3511(1).
40. See Staff Analysis, supra note 32, at 3.
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to cover the new estimates for potential exposure to loss and not
suppressed by governmental regulation, these rates would attract
adequate capital to make insurance available.41 Others argue that
tax laws and private investor expectations, further complicated by
rate regulations, make it impractical for private investors to charge
enough to cover current costs, pay taxes on profit, distribute profit to
investors, and still place enough reserve to pay claims in the event of
a major catastrophe, making government intervention necessary.42
The Florida insurance environment and market activities support
the latter view.43 Consequently, both the FWUA and Residential
JUA have continued to grow well beyond their original intent, im-
peding the recovery of the voluntary insurance market.
The 1996 Florida Legislature recognized that there were a num-
ber of problems with the existing residual market mechanisms, and
that some residual market mechanism would need to continue to
provide hurricane coverage for the foreseeable future to certain hur-
ricane prone areas.44 Implicit in the Legislature’s findings was the
conclusion that neither the current FWUA nor the Residential JUA
was designed to last indefinitely. Moreover, neither entity could sus-
tain and support a large number of policies.45
In response, the 1996 Legislature created a Working Group on
Residual Property Insurance Markets (Working Group), directed at
developing recommendations for a permanent residual market
mechanism to replace the existing Residential JUA and FWUA.46
The permanent replacement would maximize the role of the private
sector and minimize public sector responsibilities.47 The Working
Group’s recommendations for modifying the FWUA and Residential
JUA served as the basis for the new law.48 Accordingly, the new law
addressed some of the elements necessary to make these residual
market entities operate more efficiently and to reduce the overall
number of Residential JUA and FWUA policies issued.49
                                                                                                                   
41. See Interview with Vince Rio, Counsel, State Farm Mutual Co., in Tallahassee,
Fla. (Nov. 3, 1997) [hereinafter Rio Interview].
42. See id.
43. See Staff Analysis, supra note 32, at 2. That is, in spite of the large rate in-
creases, property insurance is not widely available in high risk areas today because insur-
ers still believe they need to reduce their exposure in hurricane prone areas.
44. See FLA. STAT. § 215.555 (1) (1997).
45. See id.
46. See Act effective May 21, 1996, ch. 96-194, § 9, 1996 Fla. Laws 602, 602.
47. See FLA. STAT. § 215.555 (1) (1997).
48. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 2.
49. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351 (1997).
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IV.   THE 1997 PROPERTY INSURANCE LEGISLATIVE REFORM PACKAGE
The Senate Committee on Banking and Insurance and the House
Committee on Financial Services developed legislative packages de-
signed to implement the Working Group’s recommendations. The
House and the Senate, in coordination with the insurance industry,
consumer groups, and the Department of Insurance, agreed on a fi-
nal package that became law as chapter 97-55, Florida Laws.50
A.   Major Changes to the Residential Property and Casualty Joint
Underwriting Association Program.
The 1997 legislative modifications to the Residential JUA cen-
tered on its ability to secure financing to cover major weather-related
events or pre-events planning,51 and to foster continued efforts to
shrink the Residential JUA population.52 While the Residential JUA
is not allowed to form the myriad of new entities permitted by the
FWUA,53 most of the alternative financing mechanisms such as
bonds and indebtedness are still available.54 The Residential JUA
has the authority to pledge the recoveries from the Florida Hurri-
cane Catastrophe Fund, despite lacking provisions concerning lien
priority and continuance of assessments if the program defaults.55
The new law also established standards for the sale of bonds by
either the FWUA or the Residential JUA.56 Prior to entering the
bond market, the FWUA and Residential JUA must develop the
ability to publicize and procure the requisite financial services.57
Further, the potential financial advisors or underwriters must pro-
vide disclosure statements containing a litany of information,58 and
are prohibited from paying any finders fees, bonuses, or other gra-
tuities for the FWUA or Residential JUA business.59
                                                                                                                   
50. See Act effective May 9, 1997, ch. 97-55, 1997 Fla. Laws 322 (amending FLA. STAT. §
627.351 (Supp. 1996)).
51. See id. at 339 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.351(6)(c)(3) (Supp. 1996)).
52. See id. at 328 (amending FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2)(b)(2)(a) (Supp. 1996), codified at
FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2)(b)(2)(a)(VI) (1997)).
53. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2)(b)(6)(a) (1997).
54. See id. § 627.351(6)(b)(3)(c), (6)(c)(3).
55. See id. § 627.351(6)(c)(3). The Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund was created
by the Florida Legislature during the November 1993 special session. The Catastrophe
Fund is a trust fund under the control of the State Board of Administration. Each prop-
erty insurer pays premiums to the fund, based proportionately on the insurer’s hurricane
exposure. In exchange for these premiums, the Fund promises to pay a certain percentage
of the insurer’s hurricane losses. The main purpose of the Catastrophe Fund is to permit
the tax-free accumulation of hurricane reserves. See generally id. § 215.555.
56. See id. § 627.3513.
57. See id. § 627.3513(2).
58. See id. § 627.3513(3) (including expected expenses and fees incurred by participat-
ing in the program).
59. See id. § 627.3513(4).
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While existing law provides a “market equalization charge” for
assessments imposed by the Residential JUA on Residential JUA
policyholders, the new law includes assessments imposed by the
FWUA.60 Residential JUA policyholders are thus treated similarly
when the FWUA levies assessments on insurers, which are passed
on to policyholders.
The new law also allows insurers to revise the hurricane de-
ductibles offered in policies to condominium associations and apart-
ment buildings to a minimum of three percent and a maximum of
five or ten percent.61 This modification encourages private insurers
to continue writing policies for commercial property because the
payment difference may affect the capital an insurer is willing to
risk.
As previously mentioned, insurers may recoup deficit assess-
ments imposed by residual market entities by passing the assess-
ments through to policyholders.62 The new law clarifies how the as-
sessment is passed through to policyholders by requiring insurers to
calculate separate assessment percentage factors for personal lines
in residential policies, and for commercial lines in residential poli-
cies.63 In making this calculation, an insurer may not use an assess-
ment factor that is more than three percent higher than the state-
wide average assessment percentage.64 If an insurer fails to recoup
the full amount in one year, it may recoup the deficit in subsequent
years.65
Notwithstanding this apparent limitation, the new law authorizes
assessments of approximately forty percent of current property in-
surance premiums on all policyholders in the state.66 The Legislature
has thus authorized ten percent regular and emergency assessments
for the FWUA and the Residential JUA.67 Because the cost of the
emergency assessments imposed upon insurers can be passed along
to all policyholders, all insured property owners in Florida face fi-
nancial hardship should another catastrophic storm strike. Further,
because credit against the assessments is given to insurers taking
policies out of the residual markets, the base of policies for which as-
sessments can be made is restricted.68 As the assessment policy base
is restricted, the assessment potential per policy increases. As a re-
                                                                                                                   
60. See id. § 627.351(6)(c)(10).
61. See id. § 627.701(8).
62. See supra text accompanying note 31.
63. See FLA. STAT. § 627.3512(1) (1997).
64. See id. § 627.3512(2).
65. See id.
66. See Florida DOI, HIGHLIGHTS OF THE HOMEOWNERS RATE RELIEF ACT 1 (1997) (on
file with the Fla. DOI) [hereinafter HIGHLIGHTS].
67. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351 (2)(b)(2)(d), (6)(b)(3).
68. See id. § 627.3511(2).
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sult, the cost of providing insurance to some is potentially borne by
all. Now that Florida has entered the insurance business, Florida’s
premium-paying policyholders are exposed to extraordinary assess-
ments.
B.   Major Changes to the Florida Windstorm Underwriting
Association Program
The new law made several changes to the FWUA. The FWUA
normally collects premiums for the coverage it provides; however,
when a loss sustained by the FWUA exceeds its catastrophe reserves
and a deficit is incurred, the FWUA is authorized to levy assess-
ments on member insurers.69 Prior to the enactment of the new law,
the FWUA statute permitted the FWUA to levy regular assessments
on insurers when the deficit exceeds ten percent of the aggregate
statewide direct premiums for property insurance.70 It also permitted
a levy of another ten percent of premiums to fund deficits not ade-
quately funded by the regular assessments.71
The new law clarifies that if a deficit assessment is ten percent or
less of the aggregate statewide direct written premium for property
insurance, an assessment may be levied on member insurers in an
amount equal to the deficit.72 The new law clearly indicates that the
emergency assessments may be passed through to all policyholders,
and that insurance companies may raise their premiums to recoup
the amount of the FWUA deficit assessments.73 This new language is
patterned after previous existing language in the JUA subsection,74
and it was designed to quell insurers’ fears that FWUA deficits
would be paid by the carrier without the ability to recoup the as-
sessments in its rates every time a carrier increased its market
share by writing additional property insurance in the state.75
The 1997 revision also specifically allows the FWUA Board to
make exceptions to the public policy of “coverage for all” by permit-
ting the Board to determine that some risks are uninsurable even
through the residual market.76 In addition, the law provides that if
                                                                                                                   
69. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(2)(d).
70. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(2)(d)(I) (Supp. 1996).
71. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(2)(d)(II).
72. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(2)(d) (1997).
73. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(2)(d)(III).
74. See id. § 627.351(6)(b)(3)(d) (Supp. 1996) (“Upon a determination by the board of
governors that a deficit in an account exceeds the amount that will be recovered through
regular assessments of insurers . . . , the board shall levy, after verification by the de-
partment, emergency assessments to be collected by insurers, including joint underwrit-
ing associations, upon issuance or renewal of policies in the year or years following levy of
the regular assessments.”).
75. See Rio Interview, supra note 41.
76. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2)(b)(5)(d) (1997).
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persons covered by the FWUA are offered a “take out” policy, such
that an insurer is willing to replace the FWUA policy with a regular
private market policy, the person is no longer eligible for FWUA cov-
erage.77 This could result in a significant cost increase for consumers
because the commercial policy may be rated significantly higher
based on their approved rate structure. This might also result in
giving companies willing to underwrite the windstorm coverage an
advantage over those choosing to exclude it, even though the cost of a
policy providing windstorm coverage would be greater than the cost
of a policy excluding windstorm coverage, and greater than the cost
of the FWUA’s windstorm coverage.
Before the enactment of the new law, FWUA rates were not gov-
erned by specific requirements. However, the 1997 legislation con-
tained language governing the premium rates charged by the
FWUA.78 It was previously understood that rates charged by the
FWUA were governed by the standard rating statute, which provides
that rates shall not be excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discrimina-
tory.79 Conversely, the Residential JUA statute required the rates of
the Residential JUA to match the highest rate in the county charged
by one of the twenty largest insurers.80 This ensured that Residential
JUA rates were not competitive with the private market, and that
Residential JUA would only be a last resort. The legislative intent
behind the new law provided that FWUA rates should not be com-
petitive with private market rates and that the rates must be actu-
arially sound.81
1.   FWUA Freeze and Exemption Policies
In order to allow the FWUA to make the adjustments required in
the new law and to prevent expansion of the FWUA into new areas
of eligibility, a one-year freeze on expansion of the program will run
until October 1, 1998.82 Insurance companies and consumer advo-
                                                                                                                   
77. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(5)(e).
78. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(5)(b):
It is the intent of the Legislature that the rates for coverage provided by the
association be actuarially sound and not competitive with the approved rates
charged in the admitted voluntary market such that the association functions
as a residual market mechanism to provide insurance only when the insurance
cannot be procured in the voluntary market. The plan of operation shall pro-
vide a mechanism to assure that, beginning no later than January 1, 1999, the
rates charged by the association . . . are reflective of the approved rates in the
voluntary market for hurricane coverage . . . in the various areas eligible for
association coverage.
Id.
79. See id. § 627.062 (Supp. 1996).
80. See id. § 627.351(6)(d)(2).
81. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(5)(b) (1997).
82. See id. § 627.351(2)(e) (to be repealed on October 1, 1998).
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cates resisted this provision. Proponents of the measure argued that
the growth of the FWUA was expanding at an uncontrollable rate
and time was needed to satisfy statutory changes.83 Opponents coun-
tered that the merits of a petition for FWUA eligibility can be evalu-
ated on a case-by-case basis by the Department of Insurance before
eligibility is declared, 84 and thus the “freeze” was not necessary.
Additionally, while prior law did not authorize the FWUA to ex-
empt insurers from FWUA assessments as an incentive to remove
policies from the Residential JUA, the FWUA did so with the ap-
proval of the Department of Insurance.85 The new law authorizes the
FWUA to grant an exemption from FWUA assessments for a period
not to exceed three years as an incentive to Residential JUA depopu-
lation.86 To be eligible for this exemption, no more than fifteen per-
cent of the removed policies may exclude windstorm coverage.87 At
least forty percent of the policies removed from the Residential JUA
must be from Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach counties or at least
thirty percent from these counties and an additional fifty percent in
other coastal counties.88 The exemption can be extended for an addi-
tional year with approval by the Department of Insurance if the in-
surer agrees to guarantee another year of renewability.89 The new
law also clarifies that the insurer is exempt from regular deficit as-
sessments but is not exempt from the emergency assessments im-
posed by the Residential JUA.90
2.   FWUA Assessment Policies
As discussed above, the FWUA can assess insurers when it sus-
tains deficits, and insurers are able to pass these assessments on to
policyholders.91 Conversely, the FWUA is not subject to assessment
by other residual market entities and thus does not pass the deficits
through to its policyholders.92 The new law allows the FWUA to levy
a “market equalization charge” upon its policyholders that assures
equal treatment between voluntary market policyholders and FWUA
policyholders not otherwise subject to residual market assess-
ments.93
                                                                                                                   
83. See GEOGRAPHICAL BOUNDARIES, supra note 34, at 1.
84. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2)(c)(2) (1997).
85. See Staff Analysis, supra note 32, at 10.
86. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2)(b)(2)(a)(VI) (1997).
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. § 627.351(6)(g)(3)(c); see also id. § 627.3511(3)(b)-(c).
91. See supra text accompanying note 31.
92. See FLA. STAT. § 627.351(2)(b) (1997).
93. See id. § 627.351(6)(g)(3)(b).
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3.   FWUA Debt Management Policies
The recently enacted provisions also enhanced the FWUA’s abil-
ity to manage debt in several ways. First, the emergency assess-
ments will continue until all indebtedness is retired.94 In addition,
assurances are provided that the financing and collection of assess-
ments will remain in place notwithstanding any default or financial
failure of the FWUA.95 The FWUA emergency assessments were
given priority over other liens on any underlying property because
these provisions are critical to the FWUA’s ability to secure alterna-
tive, flexible financing mechanisms such as lines of credit and
bonds.96 The FWUA should thus be able to continue collecting the
assessments necessary to address whatever situation arises.
Second, the new law provided that any local government with
residents insured by the FWUA may issue bonds to meet related fi-
nancial obligations, regardless of whether any losses occurred within
the territorial jurisdiction of the particular local government.97 While
historically bonds could have been issued by an affected local gov-
ernmental entity, the intent of the new provision is to prevent the
“proliferation, duplication, and fragmentation of such assistance
programs.”98
Third, the FWUA was allowed to form a partnership, trust, lim-
ited liability company, or a private, nonprofit mutual company, as
the entity empowered to borrow money or issue bonds.99 This allows
greater flexibility in the type of organization that may be formed,
enhancing the FWUA’s ability to achieve the best bond rate possible
since rates for private entities are often more favorable than for gov-
ernment entities.
Lastly, the FWUA was given express authorization to issue bonds
or incur indebtedness in the absence of a hurricane or other weather-
related event.100 This provision is particularly critical for the creation
of a more viable, responsible entity, so that funds may be secured
prior to the arrival of a devastating storm.
V.   SUGGESTIONS FOR THE 1998 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Recently, Florida Insurance Commissioner Bill Nelson proposed
that both the Residential JUA and FWUA be phased out by the pri-
vate market, which would assume more policies in exchange for an
                                                                                                                   
94. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(2)(d)(III).
95. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(9)(e).
96. See id.
97. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(6)(b).
98. Id. § 627.351(2)(b)(2)(e).
99. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(6)(a).
100. See id. § 627.351(2)(b)(6)(b).
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expanded Hurricane Catastrophe Fund.101 The proposal rests on the
assumption that private insurers would be more willing to provide
insurance in high risk areas knowing that the potential exposure to
risk would be limited under the modified Catastrophe Fund pro-
gram.102 Even if the private insurance companies are not willing,
then the Department of Insurance would assign the risky policies
among the private insurers.103 Accordingly, the assessments under
the Residential JUA and FWUA would be eliminated, but the Catas-
trophe Fund assessment would potentially increase from four per-
cent to ten percent of the premium. For homeowners, the potential
for assessments, emergency or otherwise, would be reduced from the
current level of forty-four percent to twelve percent of the total pre-
mium.104
While at first glance the proposal may be appealing to homeown-
ers because the risk of significant rate assessments is reduced, the
assignment of policies–which the private insurers are steering clear
of at the moment–would be a huge component of the proposal. Fur-
ther, the level of damages at which the Catastrophe Fund program
would go into effect is critical, especially for small and medium-sized
insurers. If set too high, insurers could face huge losses without any
off-set for the newly acquired high risk policies. Therefore, if forced
into taking the riskier policies, insurers may believe that significant
rate increases are essential. However, the cost of the rate increases
may counter the potential savings in assessments. In addition, the
basis for the Catastrophe Fund is an assessment on all insurance,105
not simply property insurance, so all insureds may save on their
homeowners assessment while other types of coverage is adversely
affected.
At a minimum, the discussion raises the awareness of the con-
tinuing property insurance crisis. One alternative may be to con-
tinue the freeze on growth of the FWUA106 and encourage the volun-
tary reduction of both the Residential JUA and FWUA. Once policies
move out of the underwriting associations, a cap on assessments
could be imposed while expanding the new Catastrophe Fund pro-
gram. This would allow the insurance industry to continue to recover
while newer, more viable, and efficient mechanisms are developed.
                                                                                                                   
101. See What’s Covered?, ST. PETE. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1997, at A12.
102. See id.
103. See HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 66, at 1.
104. See id.
105. See FLA. STAT. § 215.555 (1997).
106. See id. § 627.351(2)(e).
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VI.   CONCLUSION
The residual property insurance market mechanisms have en-
hanced the availability of insurance to Florida homeowners as indi-
cated by the number of policies issued. Both programs have fre-
quently run deficits and issued assessments that have stifled the
private market recovery. The new law allows the residual market
entities greater flexibility to obtain funds to compensate for the lack
of programmatic reserves, but ultimately all Florida property insur-
ance policyholders may be responsible for paying increased rates for
these programs for years to come.107
                                                                                                                   
107. See id. § 627.3512.
